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RECENT DECISIONS
the children are an "outrage upon nature in its dearest and tenderest
relations." 31 However, this is a use of the term "crime" in its
generic sense. Could the courts of Colorado charge a husband with
a crime arising from the single act of injuring his child, and addi-
tionally, charge him with a distinct and "personal" crime against
his wife? The answer would appear to be in the negative.
Although the result in the instant decision coincides with a
concept of justice in the case of injury to a close blood relation, the
Colorado courts would be hard pressed to extend it to cases of
violence perpetrated by one spouse upon a total stranger, and wit-
nessed by the other. Because of the construction of the Colorado
statute, the courts there may be committed to expanding the realm
of admissible testimony by a spouse in reference to "crimes com-
mitted by one against the other." It would appear that a statute is
needed whereby the courts of Colorado could allow the wife to
testify, and, at the same time, could preserve the concept of marital
confidence.
To this end, the statute could be modeled upon those presently
in force in New York and Illinois.
New York has approached the problem by declaring that
spouses are competent to testify except as to confidential com-
munications. 32 Illinois, on the other hand, does not recognize con-
fidential communications as privileged when there is injury to the
person or property of one spouse, or when the children are directly
injured by a spouse.3 3  Statutes such as these attempt to balance
the values of marital confidence with the practical realization that
an injured spouse should be allowed the same opportunity to testify
as any other injured person. In so doing they obviate the difficulties
inherent in strained judicial expansions, which are necessitated by
the restricted scope of statutes such as that construed in Balltrip.
IMMIGRATION -ILLEGITIMATE CHILD OF NATURALIZED CITI-
ZEN DEEMED STEPCHILD FOR IMMIGRATION PURPOSES.- The plain-
tiff, who married subsequent to becoming a naturalized United
States citizen, petitioned for a declaratory judgment classifying her
alien husband's illegitimate child as a nonquota immigrant. The
Board of Immigration Appeals sustained the District Director's
31 O'Loughlin v. People, 90 Colo. 368, 378, 10 P.2d 543, 547 (1932).
32 N.Y. Pre. LtAw § 2445. See People v. Harris, 39 Misc. 2d 193, 240
N.Y.S.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1963) wherein a spouse's letter, containing a con-
fession of guilt of the murder of the child, was held a confidential com-
munication when mailed only to the other spouse.
33 ILT ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 155-1 (Smith-Hurd 1964).
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denial of the petition because the father's illegitimate son is not his
"child," nor his spouse's, as defined in the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act. The District Court overruled the Board's determina-
tion, holding that such an illegitimate is a "child" within the mean-
ing of Sections 101(a) (27) (A) and 101(b) (1) (B) of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act. Nation v. Esperdy, 239 F. Supp.
531 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
Under Section 101(a) (27) (A), a nonquota immigrant is, inter
alia, a "child of a citizen of the United States." 1 The 1952 act
defined "child" of a United States citizen in Section 101(b) (1):
an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age who is
(A) a legitimate child; or
(B) a stepchild, provided the child has not reached the age of eighteen
years at the time the marriage creating the status of stepchild occurred;
or
(C) a child legitimatized under the law of the child's residence or
domicile, or under the law of the father's residence or domicile ... 2
In 1953, subparagraph (B) was construed in Matter of M.3
There, an illegitimate child was denied nonquota immigrant status
notwithstanding the fact that his mother, an alien, subsequently
married a United States citizen. The denial was based upon an
interpretation of the statute which would not allow even a natural
father who was a citizen, to bring his own child into the country
unless it was legitimate or properly legitimatized. The Attorney
General sanctioned this determination. However, a request was
made for congressional clarification of the term "stepchild." 4
Since Congress, in subparagraph (C), referred only to the
residence of the child or the father, the Board of Immigration
Appeals in Matter of A, considered the omission of the residence
of the mother as a "tacit acknowledgment and recognition of the
fact that it was not intended to include the child born out of wed-
lock to a mother." 5 Consequently, the Board held that children
born out of wedlock to a mother who subsequently became a citizen,
would be permitted nonquota status.8 However, the illegitimate
children of a father, who later attained citizenship status, would
be bound to the legitimatizing requirement of subparagraph (C)
before qualifying as nonquota immigrants.7  The Attorney General
rejected this distinction and ruled that, since the mother's child
166 Stat. 169 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (27) (A) (1964).
2 66 Stat. 171 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1) (1964).
3 5 I. & N. Dec. 120 (1953).
'Id. at 126.
5 Matter of A, 5 I. & N. Dec. 272, 280 (1953).
6 Matter of A, 5 I. & N. Dec. 272 (1953).
7 Id. at 283.
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was neither legitimate nor properly legitimatized, it was not en-
titled to nonquota status under the statute.
In 1955, the House Committee on the Judiciary conducted a
special study of certain administrative operations under the Im-
migration and Nationality Act. The report viewed with disfavor
the ultimate decisions in Matter of M and Matter of A. The Com-
mittee felt that:
the inability to bring about a change in the administrative interpretation
of the law dealing with "stepchildren" and "children" causes the need
for an amendment to section 101(b) which will leave no loophole for a
strained construction.8
In 1957, as a result of this study, Section 101(b) (1) was
amended, extending the definition of "child" in subparagraph (B)
to all stepchildren, "whether or not born out of wedlock," 9 and
adding subparagraph (D) to include as a citizen's "child"
an illegitimate child, by, through whom, or on whose behalf a status,
privilege, or benefit is sought by virtue of the relationship of the child
to its natural mother.'0
The Committee report accompanying the original House version
indicated the need for this amendment:
in order to alleviate hardship and provide for a fair and humanitarian
adjudication of immigration cases involving children born out of wedlock.
.. The legislative history .. . clearly indicates that the Congress in-
tended to provide for a liberal treatment of children and was concerned
with the problem of keeping families of . . . immigrants united ...
[This concept of family unity] would include the illegitimate child of the
spouse as the stepchild of the person who has married the parent of that
child."3
Although indicating congressional disapproval of the disrup-
tion of immigrant families, the amendment provided a ground upon
which the status of a mother's illegitimate child could be distin-
guished. This was clearly reflected in Matter of W,' 2 a case which
held that "the phrase 'a child, whether or not born out of wedlock'
is recognized as a child for immigration purposes only where the
mother of the illegitimate child marries a citizen. . . ." '3 This dis-
8 H.RL REP. No. 1570, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 111 (1955).
9 Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(b) (1) (B), 71 Stat. 639 (1957),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(b) (1) (B) (1964).1o Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(b) (1) (D), 71 Stat. 639 (1957), 8
U.S.C. § 1101(b) (1) (D) (1964). (Emphasis added.)
"1 H.1. REP. No. 1199, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1957).
12 7 I. & N. Dec. 685 (1958).
23 Id. at 686-87.
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tinction was based on a reading of the amended statute which ac-
corded controlling import to subparagraph (D) as a limitation on
subparagraph (B) .14
The instant case was one of first impression in this jurisdiction.
After a recital of Section 101(b) (1) (B), the Court eliminated the
possibility of a literal interpretation because of its apparent conflict
with Section 101(b) (1) (D). Noting that the congressional reports
were by no means controlling, the Court concluded that subpara-
graphs (B) and (D) were independent reactions to the unpopular,
factually distinguishable administrative decisions rendered in Matter
of M and Matter of A.15 The Court reasoned that, had Congress
intended to benefit only a mother's illegitimate child, it would have
clearly enunciated that fact. However, the use of neutral language
throughout the Committee report, which did not specifically limit
the legislative exception to a mother's illegitimate, persuaded the
Court that a father's illegitimate child was not excluded from the
statute's protection."6
Such an interpretation of "stepchild" under subparagraph (B),
the Court maintained, did not render subparagraph (D) meaning-
less. The latter subparagraph was intended to confirm the proposi-
tion that a child born out of wedlock would be treated as legitimate
to its natural mother. Its purpose was limited to an affirmation
that no one who otherwise qualified as a "child" would be precluded
from receiving immigrant privileges through its natural mother be-
cause of illegitimate birth. Thus, subparagraph (D) did not mini-
mize the significance of subparagraph (B)." Considering the his-
tory "along with the obviously broad language of subsection (B),"
the Court concluded that, on the facts of this case, the illegitimate
child was the plaintiff's "stepchild."
Prior to the instant case, spouses could avoid the effect of
Sections 101(b) (1) (B) and (D) on a father's illegitimate by
adopting the child.' 8  However, this course of action was unavail-
14 See ibid.
15 Nation v. Esperdy, 239 F. Supp. 531, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).16 Id. at 536-37.
17 Id. at 537. The Court noted, however, that the report of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, S. REP. No. 1057, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1957),
was less favorable to the petitioner. The report made no reference to the
father-child relationship. The Court reconciled this report with its decision
on the basis that the amendment to subparagraph (B) is a broad provision
and, as such, militates against the narrow interpretation urged by the
government.
'8 The statutory definition of "child" includes: "a child adopted while
under the age of fourteen years if the child has thereafter been in the
legal custody of, and has resided with, the adopting parent or parents for
at least two years. . . " (Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(b) (1) (E),
71 Stat. 639 (1957), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b) (1) (E) (1964)), and "a child who
is an eligible orphan, adopted abroad by a United States citizen and spouse
or coming to the United States for adoption by a United States citizen
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able in the principal case, since the child was over the age limit
prescribed by the adoption sections. The import of the case, then,
consists in providing an alternative solution to those in petitioner's
position, who would otherwise be unable to gain admission for their
children under nonquota status.
It is not likely that the decision will "offer attractive possibilities
for fraud," as the government contended. The holding here was
limited to situations of pre-existing family units formed outside the
United States. Therefore, its use as a precedent for the general
importation of illegitimate children would be precluded. 19
In view of the congressional expression of a policy favoring an
easing of immigration restrictions20 with reference to separated
families, the instant decision is long overdue. This case is repre-
sentative of the humanitarian approach being applied to the problem
of immigrant family unity. The 1965 amendment of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act prescribes a new "series of preference
categories that give priority to minor children . . . of persons
who have become citizens . . under the old law." 21 Sig-
nificantly, the statute does not affect Section 101(b) (1) (B)
or (D) .22 Since it is to be assumed that Congress was aware
of the instant case, its silence in this matter would seem to
indicate agreement with the Court's interpretation.
The Court, by its decision, has taken the most reasonable
avenue available, striking down an arbitrary barrier established by
a literal statutory interpretation which was clearly inconsistent with
the basic policy underlying the law's enactment.
LABOR LAW- BARGAINING ORDER INAPPROPRIATE TO REMEDY
BORDERLINE EMPLOYER UNFAIR LABOR PRAcTIcE. - On the day of
a scheduled election to determine whether twenty-eight employees of
respondent, a New York corporation, desired unionization, the em-
ployer distributed a letter to the employees which contained promises
of future benefits, in addition to an invitation to deal directly with
the respondent. Subsequent to losing the election, the union peti-
tioned the National Labor Relations Board for a "bargaining order"
which was issued by the Board upon a finding that the employer's
letter constituted an unfair labor practice. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the decision of
and spouse. . . ." (Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(b) (1) (F), 75
Stat. 650 (1961), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b) (1) (F) (1964)).
'9 Supra note 15, at 538-39.
20 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 468 (1952).
21 N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1965, p. 1, col. 1.
22 Pub. L. No. 236, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 3, 1965).
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